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Abstract Autism and schizophrenia share a history of
diagnostic conflation that was not definitively resolved until
the publication of the DSM-III in 1980. Though now
recognized as heterogeneous disorders with distinct
developmental trajectories and dissociative features,
much of the early nosological confusion stemmed from
apparent overlap in certain areas of social dysfunction. In
more recent years, separate but substantial literatures have
accumulated for autism and schizophrenia demonstrating that
abnormalities in social cognition directly contribute to the
characteristic social deficits of both disorders. The current
paper argues that direct comparison of social cognitive
impairment can highlight shared and divergent mechanisms
underlying pathways to social dysfunction, a process that can
provide significant clinical benefit by informing the develop-
ment of tailored treatment efforts. Thus, while the history of
diagnostic conflation between autism and schizophrenia may
have originated in similarities in social dysfunction, the goal
of direct comparisons is not to conflate them once again but
rather to reveal distinctions that illuminate disorder-specific
mechanisms and pathways that contribute to social cognitive
impairment.
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In his seminal 1943 paper “Autistic Disturbances of Affective
Contact”, Leo Kanner described a group of 11 children who
shared a constellation of behavioral and affective symptoms,
most notably “a powerful desire for aloneness and sameness”
(Kanner 1943). A year later, the Austrian pediatrician Hans
Asperger independently characterized several children he
deemed “little professors” who exhibited “al a c ko fe m p a t h y ,
little ability to form friendships, one-sided conversations
[and] intense absorption in a special interest” (Asperger
1944/1991). Both Kanner and Asperger, without apparent
knowledge of each other’s work, selected the term
“autism” (from the Greek autos meaning “self”)t oc a p t u r e
the characteristic egocentri s mi nt h ec h i l d r e nt h e yw e r e
observing. The simultaneous choice of label, however,
was not mere coincidence: “autism” had a long history in
the psychiatric literature, dating back to 1911 when Eugen
Bleuler used the word to describe social withdrawal in
patients with schizophrenia:
Schizophrenics, who have no more contact with the
outside world, live in a world of their own. They have
encased themselves with their desires and wishes...;
they have cut themselves off as much as possible
from any contact with the external world. This
detachment from reality, together with the relative
and absolute predominance of the inner life, we term
autism (Bleuler 1911).
Both Kanner and Asperger thus grounded their clinical
descriptions of autism within the context of established
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DOI 10.1007/s11689-010-9068-xpsychiatric nomenclature. Each was keenly aware of
Bleuler’s use of the term and deliberately selected an
accepted psychiatric label that connoted social disconnec-
tion. Although the application of such a recognized term
had the intended result of facilitating understanding of the
affective impairments they were describing, its close
association with schizophrenia inadvertently resulted in
considerable nosological confusion. Kanner and Asperger
each appeared to struggle with this tradeoff. While Kanner
maintained that autism was a distinct clinical syndrome
from schizophrenia, separated by its apparent presence from
birth, its peculiarities in repetitive interaction with objects,
and its characteristic insistence on familiarity and routine,
he believed the term “autism” was warranted because of a
shared presentation of social isolation:
Nevertheless, in full recognition of [the differences], I
was unable to find a concise expression that would be
equally or more suitably applicable. After all, these
children do start out in a state which, in a way,
resembles the end results of later-life withdrawal, and
there is a remoteness at least from the human portion
of the external world (Kanner 1973).
Similarly, Asperger argued that “autism” was an appro-
priate designation for the children he was studying given
their similarities with certain negative symptoms of
schizophrenia:
I have chosen the label autism in an effort to define
the basic disorder that generates the abnormal
personality structure of the children we are concerned
with here. The name derives from the concept of
autism in schizophrenia. Autism in this sense refers to
a fundamental disturbance of contact that is manifest
in an extreme form of schizophrenic patients
(Asperger 1944/1991).
Like Kanner, however, Asperger argued that the
syndrome he was observing was an independent condi-
tion. His basis for the distinction was that “autism” did
not share positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g.,
delusions, hallucinations, etc.) and followed a different
developmental course:
Schizophrenic patients often live in an imaginary
world of wish fulfillment and ideas of persecution…
However this type of thinking does not play a role in
the children we are concerned with here... While the
schizophrenic patient seems to show progressive loss
of contact, the children we are discussing lack contact
from the start (Asperger 1944/1991).
Although this acknowledgment of independent developmen-
tal trajectories and symptom differentiation foreshadows the
criteria that would eventually support diagnostic segregation of
the two disorders, the emphasis on a shared social profile with
schizophrenia—coupled with a term so strongly connected with
it—helped fuel a debate over the next several decades
concerning the appropriate classification of autism. Was it, as
Kanner and Asperger originally contended, categorically
independent from schizophrenia, or simply a childhood
subtype? For many years, Kanner himself oscillated on
this question, highlighting both similarities and differences
between the two conditions (Kanner 1965). This ambiguity
extended to the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM), which defined “Schizophrenic reaction,
childhood type” in part by “psychotic reactions in children,
manifesting primarily autism” (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation 1952). Similarly, the second DSM stated that
childhood schizophrenia “may be manifested by autistic,
atypical and withdrawn behavior” (American Psychiatric
Association 1968). Even the title of the preeminent outlet for
academic scholarship on autism, the Journal of Autism and
Childhood Schizophrenia, reflected the uncertain relation-
ship between the two disorders; it was not until 1979 that its
title was changed to its current name, the Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders (Schopler et al. 1979). The
resolution of the diagnostic confusion between autism and
schizophrenia would prove critically important not only for
issues relating to classification, but also to etiology,
pathophysiology, and treatment.
By the early 1970s, a consensus began to emerge that
designated autism and childhood schizophrenia as categori-
cally distinct conditions. Although the efforts of many
researchers and clinicians contributed to this development,
the work of two individuals proved to be especially
influential. The first, Michael Rutter, highlighted several key
variables that differentiated schizophrenia and autism, most
notably that the disorders occur within different families
(Rutter 1968, 1972). Later, large-scale studies supported
genetic dissociabilty by failing to find evidence for increased
rates of schizophrenia in individuals with autism above what
would be expected in the general population (Rumsey et al.
1985; Volkmar and Cohen 1991), although more recent work
has re-opened the question of genetic relationships between
the two disorders (Crespi et al. 2010; Szatmari et al. 2007).
Also, central for establishing autism and schizophrenia as
independent conditions was the work of Israel Kolvin who
recognized that the two disorders were characterized by
different ages of onset and independent developmental
trajectories (Kolvin 1971). While symptoms of autism are
observable by 3 years of age and in many cases even earlier,
the defining symptoms of schizophrenia typically do not
manifest until late adolescence or early adulthood. Even in
the rare cases of younger children with schizophrenia, there
are clear distinctions in clinical presentation from those with
autism: importantly, childhood schizophrenia but not autism
involves the presence of psychotic symptoms such as
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distinction was made explicit in the first diagnostic criteria
for autism (American Psychiatric Association 1980), which
precluded a diagnosis of autism unless there is an “absence
of delusions, hallucinations, loosening of associations, and
incoherence as in Schizophrenia”. Further supporting diag-
nostic differentiation were salient differences in the early
developmental course of the disorders: children with
schizophrenia do not appear to exhibit characteristics of
autism during the first 3 years of life, and children with
autism are not at increased risk for developing schizophrenia
later in development. In short, children with schizophrenia
more closely resemble adults with schizophrenia than
children with autism.
This work of Rutter and Kolvin ultimately helped sway
the debate, and via decades of direct comparison between
autism and schizophrenia, acceptance of partition was
finally achieved. Separation was finalized when autism
was introduced as an independent condition in DSM-III.
This separation has been maintained in subsequent editions
of the DSM, with autism continuing to be acknowledged as
a qualitatively distinct disorder.
Social dysfunction and social cognition—the foundation
for renewing comparisons
Despite the protracted history of autism and schizophrenia,
or perhaps because of it, comparative studies between the
disorders diminished considerably after publication of
DSM-III. The frequency of such studies may have slowed
due to the apparent “solution” that was reached concerning
the relationship between autism and schizophrenia, or
perhaps a new hesitancy emerged for pursuing studies that
might somehow link two disorders that had previously
required so much time and effort to separate. As a result,
sizeable independent literatures have accumulated over the
past 30 years investigating impairments in social functioning in
both disorders. These studies have largely occurred in parallel
and typically without comparison, despite notable overlap
between the two disorders in this domain. Direct comparison,
however, may still yield substantial benefit. As Kanner himself
stated over 60 years ago, “The extreme isolation from other
people, which is the foremost characteristic of early infantile
autism, bears so close a resemblance to schizophrenic
withdrawal that the relationship between the two conditions
deserves serious consideration” (Kanner 1949).
This “close resemblance” in social dysfunction remains
evident in current clinical characterizations of autism and
schizophrenia. Both continue to be defined in part by
pervasive social impairment that impairs the ability to
initiate and maintain reciprocal interaction (American
Psychiatric Association 1994). Individuals with autism
frequently have flat affect in face and speech, impoverished
language, reduced use of gesturing, concrete thinking, poor
eye contact, obsessionality, and unusual body movements,
all of which can be interpreted as symptoms of psychosis or
schizophrenia (Volkmar and Cohen 1991; Dykens et al.
1991; Wing 1986). In this context, the initial confusion in
clinical classification becomes easier to understand, and
examination of current diagnostic criteria highlights areas
of symptomatic overlap that can result in misdiagnosing
those with autism as having schizophrenia (Howlin 2005)
as well as symptom-negative patients with schizophrenia,
as having autism (Sheitman et al. 2004).
A primary focus of both autism and schizophrenia
research has been the specification of underlying neural
and neuropsychological characteristics that may contribute
to abnormalities in social dysfunction. One area that has
effectively intersected these disparate domains is social
cognition, a term that refers to the cognitive aspects of
social experience, including the perception, processing and
interpretation of social information (Brothers 1990). Social
cognitive abilities range from the basic detection of
biological motion and the recognition of facial affect to
much more sophisticated “mentalizing” skills such as theory
of mind and attribution formation. In both schizophrenia and
autism, research attention turned to social cognition after
general cognitive abilities were demonstrated to have limited
utility in explaining or improving social dysfunction (Ben
Itzchak et al. 2008;P e n ne ta l .1998). Indeed social
impairment in schizophrenia has appeared to be especially
resistant to treatment, and typically persists even when
psychotic symptoms are effectively managed (Addington et
al. 2003).
In recent years, the focus on social cognition has been
validated by several studies demonstrating that social
cognitive ability directly contributes to social functioning
in both disorders (Couture et al. 2006; Klin et al. 2002;
Pinkham et al. 2003; Hughes et al. 1997), even above and
beyond general cognitive factors (Addington et al. 2010;
Fett et al. 2010; Pinkham and Penn 2006). As such, social
cognition may offer a profitable entry point for understanding
the basis of social dysfunction and specify a potential target
for remediation.
The emergence of social cognition as a viable research
target has birthed large parallel literatures specific to each
disorder, and much like the literature addressing social
dysfunction, similarities are also markedly apparent in
social cognition. In what follows, we present a brief review
of social cognition in autism and schizophrenia highlighting
areas of overlap that we believe provides a compelling
argument for the potential benefits of direct comparison
between the two disorders. Despite the fact that compara-
tive designs have largely fallen out of favor, they offer
particular promise for revealing shared and divergent
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process that not only holds immediate implications for
identification, classification and etiology, but also for
informing and refining the development of disorder-
specific treatment efforts. Examining commonalities may
also provide insight into deficit-specific, rather than
disorder-specific, processes. In particular, overlapping
features of social cognitive dysfunction suggest that autism
and schizophrenia may share neurobiological substrates,
particularly in systems relating to mechanisms of social
functioning. At the same time, discovery of non-shared
mechanisms may serve as an indication of equifinality, in
which multiple pathways lead to similar end-points. In this
case, social dysfunction may occur for very different
reasons, and identification and understanding of divergent
mechanisms that support social impairment across multiple
disorders may aid the refinement of disorder-specific
pathophysiology. Such independent mechanisms may well
be expected to exist for autism and schizophrenia, given
their unique developmental courses and non-shared
characteristics.
Social cognition in autism
Social cognition is an area of marked dysfunction in autism
that directly contributes to the disorder’s pervasive social
deficits (for review, see Pelphrey et al. 2004b). Studies of
children and adults with autism have demonstrated exten-
sive deficits in face processing (Klin et al. 1999; Langdell
1978; for review, see Sasson 2006) affect recognition
(Baron-Cohen 1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Celani et
al. 1999; Edwards et al. 2002; Loveland et al. 1997), gaze
processing (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999a; Mundy et al. 1986),
the detection of biological motion (Blake et al. 2003), and
the visual scanning of faces (Pelphrey et al. 2002) dynamic
social interactions (Klin et al. 2002) and emotionally
charged scenes (Sasson et al. 2007). Investigations of the
neural correlates of these deficits have reliably implicated a
network of brain structures that include the fusiform gyrus
(FG), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and the amygdala (AMY)
(Pinkham et al. 2003; Pelphrey et al. 2004a) (see Fig. 1).
The FG, STS, and MPFC are activated in face
recognition (Kanwisher et al. 1997), biological motion
(Haxby et al. 2000), and theory of mind (Castelli et al.
2000), respectively, and each has been demonstrated to be
structurally and/or functionally abnormal in autism (Castelli
et al. 2000, 2002; Baron-Cohen et al. 1994; Schultz et al.
2000). The AMY, which has long served as a primary target
of social cognitive researchers for its extensive contribution
to social perception and cognition (Adolphs et al. 1995,
1998;L e D o u x1996) ,h a sa l s ob e e nr e p o r t e dt ob e
abnormal in autism, both structurally (Brambilla et al.
2003; Nacewicz et al. 2006) and functionally (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1999b; Critchley et al. 2000), and is presumed to
underlie the deficits in social appraisal and recognition of
negative affect found in the disorder (Adolphs et al. 2001;
Capps et al. 1992). The role of the AMY as a contributing
factor to the social deficits in autism is supported by the
similarity that individuals with autism have to both
individuals with AMY damage, and to monkeys that have
had ablations to their AMY early in life. For example,
individuals with autism have been reported to have stronger
reactions to typically non-threatening situations and
decreased reactions in instances where typically developing
individuals would usually exhibit fear (Bachevalier and
Loveland 2006). Additionally, they have difficulties regulating
their affective responses to both social and non-social stimuli,
and they perform similarly to individuals with bilateral AMY
lesions on tests of social trustworthiness and approachability,
as well as when identifying the emotional features in facial
expressions (Pelphrey et al. 2002; Adolphs et al. 2001, 2002;
Graham et al. 2007). Structural analysis of the AMY in autism
has also suggested that the developmental trajectory of the
AMY is altered in individuals with autism. Namely, the AMY
appears to be larger in children and young individuals with
autism (Hrdlicka et al. 2005;S p a r k se ta l .2002). This has
been hypothesized to be associated with a decrease in the
pruning within the AMY of individuals with autism (Howard
et al. 2000). Studies of adults with autism, however, have
reported reduced (Aylward et al. 1999;P i e r c ee ta l .2001;
Rojas et al. 2004) or normal AMY size (Palmen et al. 2006;
Schumann et al. 2004) suggesting that the overgrowth is
restricted to early development and is followed by a period of
either halted growth, or potentially increased neural pruning
(Aylward et al. 1999; Schumann et al. 2004).
Several fMRI studies have further suggested that the
AMY may be dysregulated in individuals with autism,
though there is controversy as to the direction of this
dysregulation. The majority of studies have found
hypoactivation in the AMY in response to emotional
faces, though this finding has not always been replicated
Fig. 1 Neural circuitry of social cognition
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Pelphrey et al. 2007;A s h w i ne ta l .2007;H a l le ta l .
2010). For example, Dalton et al. (2005)r e p o r t e das t r o n g
positive correlation between the time that individuals with
autism spend fixating on eyes and the activation elicited in
both their AMYand FG. New research suggests that some
of the discrepancy in the functional AMY findings may be
attributed to altered habitua t i o no ft h eA M Yt os o c i a l
stimuli. When measures of change over time in activation
of AMY and FG to neutral facial stimuli in adults with
autism spectrum disorders and healthy comparison adults
were compared, the comparison group evidenced signifi-
cantly greater AMY habituation bilaterally than the autism
spectrum group, and this was associated with more severe
social impairments (Kleinhans et al. 2009). Together these
findings suggest that the AMY plays an integral role in
establishing and maintaining proper social cognitive
responses to environmental cues and that AMY dysfunc-
tion likely contributes to the social deficits seen in autism.
In addition to the AMY, the FG has been a region of
great interest in the social cognitive research of autism.
Several studies have reported decreased activation in the
FG to a variety of social tasks in individuals with autism
(Schultz et al. 2000; Critchley et al. 2000; Pierce et al.
2001); however, this has not always been replicated in tasks
of more basic face processing (Dalton et al. 2005;
Hadjikhani et al. 2004, 2007) and the processing of familiar
faces (Pierce et al. 2004). It has been suggested that the
hypoactivation may be due to decreased attention to the
face stimuli, as evidenced by scan path analysis (Dalton et
al. 2005) rather than an association with a more basic
deficit in FG function. Like the AMY, the FG has been
found to have structural alterations, in addition to functional
deficits, in individuals with autism. These structural
alterations include decreased numbers of neurons in the
FG and a smaller size of the neurons that are present as
compared to typically developing individuals (van Kooten
et al. 2008).
The role of the STS in the pathophysiology of autism has
been demonstrated utilizing a number of paradigms. The
STS is important for processing the changeable aspects of
social stimuli (Haxby et al. 2000; Winston et al. 2004), and
specifically, it is important for differentiating biological
motion from non-biological motion (Pelphrey et al. 2003)
and is involved in utilizing eye-gaze information to infer
the mental states of others (Hoffman and Haxby 2000;
Pelphrey et al. 2004b). Individuals with autism have been
shown to have difficulties with both of these social
processes, as noted above, and fMRI experiments suggest
that such impairments are at least in part due to deficiencies
in STS activation. For example, the STS of typically
developing individuals has been shown to activate in
response to stimuli that approximate biological motion,
but not to stimuli that share all of the same perceptual
qualities as the biological motion with the exception they
approximate mechanical motion (Pelphrey et al. 2003). A
review by Pelphrey and Carter (2008) notes that this
differential effect may not be present in individuals with
autism. Instead, the STS of individuals with autism may
activate similarly to both biological and non-biological
motion. Furthermore, the STS of typically developing
individuals has been shown to activate to a greater extent
in conditions where the eye-gaze information of another
person is incongruent with respect to what is expected (e.g.,
if the other person looks away from a suddenly appearing
stimulus), while the STS of individuals with autism does
not appear to make this distinction (Pelphrey et al. 2005). In
addition to the functional differences of STS activation,
recent reports suggest that there are also structural differ-
ences in the STS of individuals with autism. Specifically,
after controlling for both age and total brain volume, the
right STS appears to be larger in individuals with autism as
compared to typically developed controls (Jou et al. 2010).
Collectively, these findings indicate significant impair-
ments in social cognitive functioning in autism both at the
behavioral and neural level, though a gap remains in the
autism literature for charting the structural and functional
trajectory of these regions over the course of development.
Because autism is a persistent neurodevelopmental disorder
whose symptoms can begin to be observable by 12 months
of age (Zwaigenbaum et al. 2005), the preponderance of
autism research has focused either on young children or on
adults, depending on testing demands and population
access. A critical need remains, however, for assessing
developmental changes in social cognitive impairment and
to determine how early-emerging deficits in “building
block” social cognitive skills such as joint attention and
social orienting contribute to the construction of broader
abnormalities in social cognition later in development.
Social cognition in schizophrenia
The centrality of social dysfunction in schizophrenia has
prompted considerable study of factors that may contribute
to these impairments. Accordingly, social cognition is
increasingly recognized as a core domain of cognitive
functioning in schizophrenia (Addington et al. 2010; Green
et al. 2005; Harvey and Penn 2010). A substantial body of
work has demonstrated that adults with schizophrenia are
impaired across a number of social cognitive domains
(Penn et al. 2006) including emotion perception (Edwards
et al. 2002; Kohler et al. 2010; Pinkham et al. 2007a); for
review, see Li et al. 2010, theory of mind (Bora et al. 2009;
Sprong et al. 2007; Mier et al. 2010), the perception of
social cues (Archer et al. 1994; Van't Wout et al. 2009),
making complex social judgments (Baas et al. 2008; Haut
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et al. 2002; Phillips and David 1998; Streit et al. 1997), and
detecting biological motion (Kim et al. 2005). Additionally,
individuals with schizophrenia show biases in attributional
style, another domain of social cognition that refers to the
way individuals explain the behaviors of others (Aakre et
al. 2009; Bentall et al. 2001; Langdon et al. 2010).
Investigations of structural changes in critical nodes
along the social cognition network, including the FG, STS,
MPFC, and AMY, have been less consistent. While some
studies have reported volumetric reductions in the FG (Lee
et al. 2002) and AMY (Wright et al. 2000), others reported
no significant group differences in AMY volume (Goghari
et al. 2010) raising the question of the unique role of the
AMY in social cognitive impairment in schizophrenia.
Additionally, abnormal levels of activation have been noted
in both the FG (Quintana et al. 2003) and AMY (Pinkham
et al. 2007b) while viewing and evaluating faces although
with inconsistent findings, ranging from reduced AMY
response to fearful faces (Brunet-Gouet and Decety 2006;
Pinkham et al. 2008a) to increased activity in medial
temporal lobe structures, including the AMY (Kosaka et al.
2002; Holt et al. 2006; Russell et al. 2007; Gur et al. 2007).
Such differences may be attributed to variations in
experimental designs, drug status, antipsychotic dose, and
genetic variability in the patient population. Recent
evidence suggests that reduced limbic activity in schizophrenia
in response to social emotional stimuli may not represent a core
heritable trait aspect of the disorder, but rather may be
associated with “state” characteristics, such as treatment and
symptom severity (Rasetti et al. 2009). It is therefore possible
that limbic, and specifically AMY activation deficits, may not
be equally central to the pathophysiology of social cognition
in autism and schizophrenia. Studying individuals at risk for
the two disorders, such as unaffected siblings may provide
critical clues into this possibility.
Alterations along other nodes in the fronto-limbic
circuitry in response to social emotional stimuli are also
reported in schizophrenia (see Fig. 1). For instance, reduced
frontal cortex volumes (Convit et al. 2001; Crespo-Facorro
et al. 2000) as well as reduced MPFC activation during
theory of mind tasks (Brunet et al. 2003), are also evident
in adults with schizophrenia. Notably, despite evidence of
volumetric reductions in the superior temporal gyrus
(Davatzikos et al. 2005), some studies suggest that STS
functioning may be largely intact in schizophrenia. Both
studies of theory of mind and social evaluations of faces
have failed to find activation differences in the STS
between individuals with schizophrenia and healthy adults
(Pinkham et al. 2008a; Brunet et al. 2003) (although see
(Mier et al. 2010) for a recent exception).
While behavioral and neural impairments in social cognition
are firmly established in adults with schizophrenia, substantially
less is known about how these impairments develop or to what
degree they are evident in children and adolescents prior to
i l l n e s so n s e t .T h e s eg a p sm a yi np a r tb ea t t r i b u t e dt ot h e
relatively late onset of illness associated with schizophrenia;
however, recent advances in identifying individuals at risk for
the development of schizophrenia capitalize on the prodromal
phase of illness and provide valuable opportunities for
examining when and how social cognitive impairments emerge
in adults. Such studies have identified both impairments in
theory of mind (Marjoram et al. 2006;Y uS u ne ta l .2008)a n d
emotion recognition among individuals who are at risk
(Addington et al. 2008a), though there is limited information
regarding the potential neural underpinnings of these
behavioral deficits. Structural MRI investigations support
reductions in the AMY and AMY-hippocampal complex
volumes in at-risk adolescents (Keshavan et al. 1997,
2002;L a w r i ee ta l .2003; Schreiber et al. 1999;C h a ne ta l .
2009), and one study has reported abnormal activation of
several brain regions related to social cognition including
the FG (Seiferth et al. 2008). This initial evidence
demonstrates that neural abnormalities precede formal
illness onset and suggest that the emergence of social
cognitive deficits in schizophrenia may follow a distinct
developmental trajectory.
Integrative studies
As these summaries demonstrate, a qualitative comparison
of both literatures indicates that autism and schizophrenia
exhibit strikingly similar abnormalities at both the behavioral
and neural levels across a wide range of social cognitive
abilities. Drawing definitive conclusions across disorders
from these studies is difficult, however, as the parallel nature
of the work has resulted in the use of tremendously varied
methodologyandsamplecharacteristics.Additionally,arange
of experimental tasks has been used, many of which are novel
andspecifictoasinglestudy,andthereforelackingreplication
within the same clinical group, much less utilization with a
comparison disorder. This lack of uniformed social cognitive
measuresinhibitsthepotentialforreachingsoundconclusions
acrosstheclinicalgroups.Furthermore,samplecharacteristics
often differ widely across studies. Because autism is diag-
nosed in early childhood while the onset of schizophrenia
typically does not occur until early adulthood, independent
studies of social cognition in each of the two disorders often
includegroupsofincomparableages.Eveninstudiesofadults
with autism, level of functioning and general cognitive
abilities can differ substantially from similar studies of adults
with schizophrenia. These differences in sample compo-
sition have made comparisons across studies all the more
complicated.
Well-designed and well-matched direct comparisons
between autism and schizophrenia avoid these problems,
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patterns of social cognitive performance. The handful of
behavioral studies that have embraced this approach
indicate that the similarities between disorders may not be
as comprehensive as the independent literatures would
suggest. While several direct comparisons have highlighted
similar impairments in certain capacities for autism and
schizophrenia—theory of mind (Craig et al. 2004; Pilowsky
et al. 2000), eye gaze on faces in social scenes (Sasson et al.
2007), and judgments of facial trustworthiness and the
identification of emotion from impoverished “point-light
motion displays” (Couture et al. 2010)—others have found
differences, including greater impairment in autism than
schizophrenia in facial affect recognition (Bolte and
Poustka 2003; Van Lancker et al. 1989) and social orienting
(Sasson et al. 2007). The single direct neural comparison of
social cognitive functioning between autism and schizophrenia
(Pinkham et al. 2008a) demonstrated comparable levels of
hypoactivation in a network of regions implicated in social
cognitive processing, including the FG, AMY, and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex in both disorders. These findings were
interpreted as revealing a shared neural basis for social
cognitive impairment; however, the sample sizes were small,
and future direct neural comparisons are clearly needed to
determine whether different disorders with similar behavioral
characteristics truly show similarities in brain circuitry and brain
functioning, or whether different neural profiles may underlie
surface similarities.
Shared social cognitive impairments—convergence
and divergence
What explains the seemingly shared social cognitive
impairments between autism and schizophrenia? From one
perspective, this overlap may indicate convergence across
multiple domains. Convergence may suggest a shared
genetic etiology in which there are genes that are associated
with social cognitive deficits spanning both disorders.
Indeed, recent work indicates a link between the Disrupted
in Schizophrenia 1 (DISC1) gene and aspects of mental
illness that co-occur in autism and schizophrenia (Marx J
2007). Additionally, common chromosomic regions have
been implicated in each disorder (Di Cristo 2007; Vorstman
et al. 2006) and a copy number variant disruption of the
neurexin-1 gene (Szatmari et al. 2007; Friedman et al.
2006) has also been reported for both. Finally, both
disorders have been associated with deficits in multiple
genes important for proper neurodevelopment (for review,
see Fatemi 2010).
Convergence in social cognitive deficits may also
indicate a shared neural profile in autism and schizophrenia
(Pinkham et al. 2008b) in which abnormal functioning of
brain regions in the social cognitive neural network
similarly affects both groups. Although Pinkham et al.
(Pinkham et al. 2008a) remains the only direct comparison
of activation in the social cognitive network between the
two disorders, the fact that shared impairments in face
processing, theory of mind and other social cognitive
abilities are well mapped to specific neural regions,
independently studied in each disorder, suggests that autism
and schizophrenia may in fact share abnormalities in the
“social brain” that account for the widely reported
behavioral deficits in social cognition.
The etiology of these shared neural profiles, however,
remains very much in question. A recent review of existing
datasets characterizing autism and schizophrenia (Cheung
et al. 2010) has suggested that despite significant overlap in
neuroanatomy common to both autism and schizophrenia,
there are also significant differences and unique features to
each disorder. For instance, lower gray matter volume
within limbic-striato-thalamic circuitry appears to be common
to both disorders, whereas decreased gray matter volume in the
AMY in adulthood appears to be a feature of schizophrenia.
This contrasts with other studies that have emphasized the
centrality of the AMY in autism (Baron-Cohen et al. 2000)a s
compared with the association of AMY volume reduction
with illness progression in schizophrenia. This heterogeneity
in neuroanatomical findings in autism and schizophrenia
highlights the need to better understand the associated
neurobiological pathways underlying the convergent social
cognitive profiles that emerge in adulthood for each disorder.
Indeed, while reports of convergence undoubtedly serve
a valuable need by helping target potential shared genetic
and neural mechanisms, they may nevertheless occlude the
discovery of disorder-specific mechanisms that may better
inform etiology and pathophysiology. In this sense,
convergence showcases provocative overlap between the
two conditions, but cannot account for how or why this
overlap occurs. As remarkable as the similarities often
appear, they do not necessarily imply shared etiology or
development of these impairments. Adults with autism
and adults with schizophrenia might both exhibit abnormal
social behaviors, and even perform similarly on many social
cognitive tasks, yet clinically and interpersonally they often
present very differently. What accounts for these differences?
And how do we capture them? One approach is to seek out
divergence in addition to convergence by highlighting
specific aspects of social cognitive performance that may
differ between the two disorders despite general similarities.
In this sense, when assessing social cognitive performance in
autism and schizophrenia, it is not enough to address the
question of performance accuracy, but also the question of
process, or how each group performs the task. While
individuals in both clinical populations may perform
similarly on a wide range of social cognitive tasks, the
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and judgments may differ markedly between groups, and
indeed, even between individuals. An approach emphasizing
divergence, therefore, acknowledges the overlap in social
cognitive impairment, but conceptualizes shared impairment
as a developmental end-point that must be differentiated
from developmental process. Thus, locating aspects of
divergence may represent disorder-specific mechanisms that
provide clues about the distinct pathways that can lead to
shared social cognitive end-points.
As an example of such work, Sasson et al. (2007)
reported that, relative to typically developing comparison
participants, both adults with autism and adults with
schizophrenia demonstrated reduced visual attention to
faces while making emotional evaluations within complex
social scenes. Such a finding, as others before it, identifies a
shared abnormality between the two disorders in an aspect
of social information processing, and as such, provides
another example of convergence in social cognitive
performance. However, this finding alone cannot determine
whether similar or discrepant mechanisms contributed to
the overlap in the two groups. By extending their findings
to also examine the latency to fixate gaze to faces in the
scenes, the authors found an important mechanistic
discrepancy between the autism and schizophrenia
g r o u p s :o n l yt h ea u t i s mg r o u pf a i l e dt oo r i e n tt of a c e s
normally. While both the schizophrenia group and
typically developing comparison participants oriented to
faces quicker when they included meaningful emotional
i n f o r m a t i o nr e l a t i v et ow h e ns u c hi n f o r m a t i o nw a s
digitally erased, the autism group oriented at the same
rate across both conditions. Thus, only the autism group
failed to modulate their orienting mechanism based upon
the presence of discernable facial affect and, while both
groups shared an abnormality in utilizing facial informa-
tion for assessing emotional content within the scenes,
they differed in the ability to seek out emotionally
relevant cues within these complex social stimuli. This
impairment in social orienting, specific to the autism
group,isconsistentwithdevelopmentalstudiesindicatingthat
individuals with autism demonstrate impaired orienting to
social stimuli from very early in life (Baranek 1999;D a w s o n
et al. 2004; Osterling et al. 2002) and as such, highlights a
potential mechanism that may constitute a fundamental and
persistent characteristic unique to autism that is not shared
with schizophrenia.
It is reasonable to assume that there may be other
divergent mechanisms of social cognitive impairment
between autism and schizophrenia. Although both share
deficits in a range of social cognitive abilities, a number of
reasons suggest that mechanisms supporting these impairments
may differ. Firstly, the markedly different ages of onset suggest
that separate developmental pathways may underlie the
emergence of social cognitive impairment in autism and
schizophrenia. A recent work from our group supports this
notion by finding evidence suggesting normative levels of
experience with faces during childhood and adolescence in
schizophrenia (Pinkham et al. 2008b) with social cognitive
impairments emerging most prominently after the first
psychotic episode in early adulthood (Pinkham et al. 2007a).
In contrast, from early childhood individuals with autism
demonstrate profound impairments in face perception that
persist throughout the lifespan (Sasson 2006).
Secondly, the handful of studies that have directly
compared social cognition in autism and schizophrenia
(Sasson et al. 2007; Craig et al. 2004; Pilowsky et al. 2000;
Bolte and Poustka 2003) suggest an intriguing pattern in
which individuals with schizophrenia may outperform
individuals with autism on tasks of basic social perception
(e.g., emotion identification and social orienting) but
perform similarly to individuals with autism on tasks that
require higher levels of social cognitive skill (e.g., inferring
intent and belief). Although speculative, this raises the
interesting possibility that the two disorders may differ in
the earliest point of social cognitive disruption; while
autism may be characterized by primary impairments in
social perceptual mechanisms that lead to social cognitive
dysfunction, schizophrenia may retain intact social percep-
tion but show abnormalities in higher order social cognitive
processes. Alternatively, one disorder may be characterized
by an early disruption in the functioning of a specific node,
whereas social cognitive dysfunction in the other disorder
may be a result of a loss of connectivity and top down
regulation of early social affective perception, as depicted
in the theoretical model in Fig. 2. Additionally, the direct
comparison of other domains in autism and schizophrenia
suggest divergent profiles in general cognition (Bolte et al.
2002) and perception (Bolte et al. 2007), each of which
could potentially contribute to important mechanistic
dissociations in social information processing. Future
research that examines how differences in these broader
domains impact social cognitive abilities in the two
d i s o r d e r si sw a r r a n t e d .
Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that autism and
schizophrenia may differ in strategies for evaluating social
and emotional content. Individuals with schizophrenia may
be more likely to misinterpret social cues by “jumping to
conclusions” in their appraisal of emotional information
(Freeman 2007), while individuals with autism may exhibit
difficulty decoding emotional information due to perceptual
integration impairments that hinder the interpretation of
complex social information (Happe and Frith 2006). Both
strategies may result in poor performance on social
cognitive tasks, though the underlying mechanisms may
differ. One compelling new theory suggests that autism and
schizophrenia may represent diametric genetic conditions
94 J Neurodevelop Disord (2011) 3:87–100that manifest in more “under-developed” social abilities in
autism (e.g., language, theory of mind) and a more “over-
developed” social phenotype in schizophrenia (e.g.,
paranoia) (Crespi et al. 2010; Crespi and Badcock
2008). From this perspective, the social impairments in
autism and schizophrenia may be conceptualized by a
differentiation of greater hyposociality in autism and
hypersociality in schizophrenia (at least in its paranoid
variant). Evidence for this segmentation is supported by
studies demonstrating exaggerated theory of mind biases
in schizophrenia that result in the over- and misattribution
of intentionality (Abu-Akel and Bailey 2000;F r i t h2004;
Montag et al. 2010;W a l t e re ta l .2009), while studies of
theory of mind impairments in autism relate more to the
under attribution of mental states (Baron-Cohen 1995;
Happe 1994). Future comparative research that further
explores and refines this distinction may prove valuable.
Challenges and conclusions
While the direct comparison of autism and schizophrenia
offers the potential to expose independent mechanisms
contributing to social cognitive dysfunction, the process of
implementing such studies presents significant challenges.
Recruitment and assessment across multiple clinical
populations can be difficult, especially for researchers
who may be more familiar with, and have greater access
to, only one of the two disorders. Collaboration among
researchers who share expertise and resources can help
mitigate this problem. An additional challenge occurs in
selecting appropriate age groups to compare, especially
given the vastly different developmental courses of
autism and schizophrenia. While much of the social
cognition work in autism has occurred with children of
various ages, the preponderance of studies in schizophrenia
has occurred with adults. Limiting comparisons to matched
samples ofadultswithautismandadultsschizophrenia avoids
this confound but may introduce others, as the two groups
may differ in medication usage and/or treatment history.
Designs that examine neurophysiological mechanisms that
arelessaffectedbymedicationandtreatmentmaythereforebe
preferred to those that are more directly impacted.
Comparative studies also need not be limited to adults.
Investigations of younger individuals may eliminate some
of the confounds posed by adult studies, and also present an
opportunity to examine the emergence of impairments
during a period of rapid change in brain and behavior. A
substantial literature has developed indicating that social
impairments in individuals with schizophrenia predate
formal diagnosis, not only during the prodromal phase in
adolescence (Addington et al. 2008b; Ballon et al. 2007;
Cannon et al. 2008) but also during early childhood
(Asarnow 1988; Isohanni et al. 2000; Jones 1997; Jones
and Tarrant 2000; Mirsky et al. 1995). These studies highlight
the protracted developmental course of schizophrenia and
demonstrate that social deficits are not simply a byproduct of
symptoms that occur with formal onset of the illness (e.g.,
anhedonia), but rather an early-emerging, defining, and
persistent characteristic of the disorder. Moreover, early
identification of individuals at risk for schizophrenia is
improving (Cannon et al. 2007) and thus offers increased
potential for the study of social cognitive abilities prior to the
formal onset of illness. Work focusing on children and
adolescents at high risk for psychosis therefore provides a
basis for pursuing developmentally based comparative studies
with autism and offers promise for charting the multiple
trajectories leading to the overlapping social cognitive deficits
found in adulthood.
Identifying dissociable mechanisms may help deconstruct
the complex processes underlying social cognitive impairments
and facilitate the identification of disorder-specific pathways
and mechanisms. Furthermore, linking these mechanisms to
developmental processes during critical periods of brain
developmentcouldhelprefineourunderstandingofthespecific
brain-behavior transactions subserving emergent abnormalities
in social dysfunction. The search for divergent mechanisms
underlying social cognitive impairment in autism and
schizophrenia becomes particularly relevant for the
development of efficacious treatment and intervention
Fig. 2 Theoretical models of
the neurobiological underpin-
nings of social cognitive
dysfunction in schizophrenia
and autism
J Neurodevelop Disord (2011) 3:87–100 95programs. By emphasizing convergence in our treatment
approaches rather than divergence, we run the risk of
treating superficial similarities rather than root causes. As
Kanner stated while referring to autism and schizophrenia
(here identified as “the schizophrenia bundle”): “When we
stopsearchingfor anidenticalcause andtreatmentofdifferent
ailments tied together in the schizophrenia bundle, we may
expect the opening up of new and clearer vistas” (Kanner
1965).
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